Held, that R.S.C., ch. 124, sec. 4, applied, and that as the money was paid by the insurance company in connection with business done contrary to the Act, the company could not recover.
(April 25th, 1896.—(;olden Rule Alliance vs. Bank of British North America, in Supreme Court of New Brunswick, Vic]. 22, Canada Law Journal, p. 595.)
6.--FIRE INSURANCE—STATUTORY CONDITIONS, STEAM T HRE¢IIER, NOTICE OF LOSS, CHANGE OF
INTEREST, ASSIGNMENT OF POLICY.
i1.•.) A provision in a fire insurance policy that "the assured shall maintain insurance on the property covered by this policy of not less than seventy-five per cent of the actual cash value thereof, and that failing so to do the assured shall be a co-insurer to the extent of such deficit, and in that capacity shall hear his, her or their proportion of any loss," is a condition and not a mere direction as to the mode of ascertaining the amount of the loss, and it is void if not printed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Judgment of Armour, C. J.. affirmed.
March 10th, 1896.-ACauless vs. Lancashire Insurance Company, 23 Ontario Appeal Reports, p. 224.)
(l.) The defence to an action to recover the loss alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiffs by the destruction by fire of property insured by the defendants, was that the plaintiffs' claim was vitiated by the 15th statutory condition to which the defendants' policies were subject, because of the following false and fraudulent statements in a statutory declaration forming part of the proof of loss: (1.) That the fire originated at a specified time from the enlbcls of a previous fire upon the same premises (2.) that the fires were not caused by the wilful act or neglect, procurement, means or contrivance of the manager or any officer of the plaintiffs' ; (3.) that the schedules attached to the declaration contained as particular an act-smut of the loss as the nature of the case permitted, and that such account was just and true.
Upon an application for particulars :
Held, (1.) that the plaintiffs were entitled to know what acts of omission or commission the defendants intended to charge the plaintiffs' manager with, as constituting the negligence imputed to him, and in what way it was charged that the tires 'cere caused by his procurement. means or contrivance : 12.) that as to the origin of the fire, the statement that it (lid not occur at the time and in the way stated, and that the untrue statement was made with intent to defraud the defendants, was sufficient information to give the plaintiffs, and the defendants could not be required to give further particulars without disclosing their evidence merely ; (3.) nor should fin ther particulars be required as to how the declaration that the fire was not caused by the wilful act of the manager, was false and fraudulent. The statement that the fire was caused by his wilful act was sufficient ; (4.) that as to the alleged falsity and fraud of the declaration with respect to the extent of the loss, it was sufficient for the defendants to say that the plaintiffs had overstated by II specified stun the loss on the whole of the articles insured, without saying by how much the plaintiffs had overstated the loss on each of the classes of articles.
(December 15th, 1896—Chief Justice Meredith : Ratrine Lumber Company vs. Liverpool and London and (:lobe Insurance Company, 17 Ontario Practice Reports, p. 318.)
On.) A provision in a policy of fire insurance permitting the insured to use " for the purpose of threshing the crops on the premises, a steam thresher, with an efficient spark arrester," does not by inference prohibit the use of a steam engine in connection with a machine for crushing grain.
The use of a steam engine on one occasion in connection with a machine for crushing grain, is not a change material to the risk within the meaning of the statutory condition. That condition refers to some structural alteration in the premises or habitual or permanent alteration in the nature of the work or business carried on. Judgment of 51r. Justice Robertson, affirmed.
(November 10th, 1896. (Johnston is. Dominion Grange Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 23 Ontario Appeal Reports, p. 729.)
u.) A notice of loss on the twentieth day after the fire is not a compliance with the condition of a policy of insurance against fire, which requires that such notice shall be given " forthwith after loss," and compliance with such stipulation is a condition precedent to action on the policy.
(October 29th, 1896—Manchester Fire Assurance Co., Appellant, and Guerin, Respondent, 5 Queen's Bench Reports, province of Quebec, p. 434.)
(o. ( A policy of fire insurance on a factory and machinery contained a condition making it void if the said property was sold or corn-eyed, or the interest of parties therein changed.
Hi-bl. affirming the decision of the Supreme Court of New Brunswick, that by a chattel mortgage given by the assured on said property, his interest therein was changed and the policy forfeited under said condition.
Held, further, that an agent with powers limited to receiving and forwarding applications for insurance had no authority to waive a forfeiture caused by such breach.
(November 5th, 1896—Torrop rs. Imperial Fire Insurance Company, 26 Reports Suprene Court of Canada, p. 585.)